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Abstract
This article appeals to heterogeneity in workers’ non-wage preferences to model
taste-based discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay lower wages to
minority workers, whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm in the
market produces a substantial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, discrimination
allows unprejudiced firms to make non-zero profits, so that they have little incentive to
drive out prejudiced firms. As the market does not eliminate discrimination, state
intervention is required. Indirect policies do not affect the absolute wage gap between
the two groups, but may be more likely to be used than direct policies.
Keywords: Discrimination, Oligopsony, Wage gap
JEL Classification: J42, J71, L13
1 Introduction
Competition and discrimination on the labor market are closely related both in theory
and in empirical work. The main finding, which comes from the Becker (1971)’s model,
is that competition has a negative impact on discriminatory outcomes. The concept
of discrimination was introduced into economics by Becker as the differential treat-
ment of two individuals with identical observable productive characteristics, due to an
observable non-productive characteristic. Becker suggests that discrimination reflects the
taste of employers, coworkers, or customers. In this framework, members of the group
which is discriminated against receive lower wages in order to be hired and accepted
as employees, coworkers,or salespersons. This analysis was criticized by Arrow (1971),
who argued that the model is unstable and that discrimination will disappear via com-
petition. Perfect competition produces a zero-profit market, so that prejudiced firms,
which are less competitive due to their higher wages, exit the market. Their contin-
ued presence requires them to make extra profit or be more productive than other
firms in order to stay in the market. By way of reaction, Phelps (1972) and Arrow
(1971) improved the explanation of discrimination by considering it as a result of beliefs.
When workers do not belong to their own group, employers use an expectation, real or
assumed, of the productivity levels of groups of workers as a whole to set the offered
wage. In general, firms believe that workers in other groups are less productive on aver-
age than those who are in the majority. Minority group workers thus earn less than
their majority counterparts. This statistical discrimination will disappear over time as
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employers learn the true productivity of their workers, except if firms can use their
market power against the discriminated workers. Altonji and Pierret (2001) highlight
this phenomenon using job characteristics and workers’ results to AFQT tests in the
USA.
Empirical work provides support for Becker’s theory by showing that greater compe-
tition reduces wage differentials, although discrimination persists. These results depend
on two key inputs: the measures of competition and labor market discrimination. First,
exogenous competitive shocks to a particular sector show that competition reduces
the wage gap by gender and by race, enabling workers in the discriminated group to
attain higher job positions.1 Second, the comparison of different sectors with differ-
ent degrees of competition within a country shows that the wage gap is lower in less
concentrated markets.2 Third, the international trade liberalization reduces the gen-
der wage gap.3 The main conclusion from these papers is that imperfect competition
justifies the persistence of discrimination on the labor market. This implies that prej-
udiced companies receive rents or are more productive than other firms and can thus
satisfy their taste for discrimination while remaining competitive and staying in the
market.
The above analysis focuses on the relationship between product market competition
and discrimination. However, discrimination is not only inconsistent with competition
on the product market but it also provides a challenge to the existence of labor market
competition. In the latter, workers are paid according to their marginal productivity, and
two workers with identical ability should receive equal pay. Nevertheless, with discrimi-
nation, employers do not pay workers at marginal productivity and take non-productive
worker characteristics into account. In order to be wage setters, employers need some
market power in order to fix the wage. Consequently, imperfection on the labor market is
one argument for the persistence of discrimination in a competitive product market and,
as this paper shows, will lead every firm to discriminate, whatever their tastes or beliefs.
Theoretical search models of discrimination use to explain discrimination persis-
tence using labor market frictions.4 In particular, Black (1995) explains the lower wage
of minority workers by their lower reservation wage due to a smaller number of job
offers. The model developed below confirms previous findings of matching models as
the persistence of discrimination, induced by imperfection of the labor market. How-
ever, it releases some assumptions and uses new channels to explain the wage gap. The
results highlight the importance of firms’ location in the wage gap. Moreover, as dis-
crimination is persistent, the paper studies several public policies aiming at fighting
discrimination.
In this paper, discrimination is introduced in a taste-based model where work-
ers are not paid at marginal productivity. Workers’ utility functions include the
non-wage characteristics of the job. Heterogeneity in worker preferences allows
firms to exercise market power in the labor market, which is thus oligopsonis-
tic. According to the theoretical arguments in Manning (2003a) and as shown by
an increasing literature, considering the labor market as oligopsonistic reflects real-
ity. Boal and Ransom (1997) and more recently Manning (2011) summarize stud-
ies highlighting monopsony and point out issues at stake. Empirically, Staiger et al.
(2010) and Ransom and Sims (2010) show monopsony with respect to nurses and
teachers in the USA, respectively. Booth and Katic (2011) estimate labor supply
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elasticity around 0.7 in Australia, confirming monopsony power existence. Falch
(2011) points out monopsony in Norway concerning teachers. Barth and Dale-
Olsen (2009) indicate that 70–90 % of the gender wage gap among low-skilled
workers is explained by monopsonistic discrimination. Ransom and Oaxaca (2010)
estimate labor elasticities between 1.5 and 2.7 in US grocery stores depending
on sex.
This model of oligopsony with heterogeneous worker preferences is based on Salop
(1979), who enriches the Hotelling (1929)’s model with a circle city. This model of
oligopsony with heterogeneous worker preferences is based on a combination of both
concepts. In the presence of taste-based discrimination, it yields an enduring wage gap
between the majority and the minority without worker segregation. Consequently, this
model does not exactly reproduce geographical breakdown by ethnicity and fits bet-
ter gender than race discrimination. The main contributions of this paper are, first,
that discrimination does not come from a productivity gap, real or assumed, between
minority and majority group workers. Second, a single prejudiced firm is sufficient
to induce a significant wage gap in the market. Further, non-prejudiced firms dis-
criminate against the minority without having any taste for discrimination or beliefs
regarding them. Furthermore, firms make more profits when they are located in an
area close to similar firms. If higher competition decreases the wage gap, it totally
vanishes if and only if commuting costs disappear or if the number of firms tends
to infinity. Moreover, unprejudiced firms have no incentive to compete with preju-
diced firms to drive the latter out, as they profit from the existence of discrimination.
Consequently, discrimination can persist even in the long term. As discrimination
will not disappear via competition, governments consequently have to introduce pub-
lic policies. In this paper, these consist of equal wage laws, employment subsidies,
introduction of a minimum wage, affirmative action, and transport improvements and
subsidies.
To my knowledge, this is the first time that this model has been applied to the issue of
labor market discrimination. Thisse and Zenou (1995), Wauthy and Zenou (1999), and
Hamilton et al. (2000) have used this model to analyze employment and training policies.
Bhaskar and To (2003) have also employed it to consider wage dispersion and survey the
possible uses of the model in Bhaskar et al. (2002).
This paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2 for the case of
four firms, with an analysis of the effects of competition on wages. Section 3 then sets out
the policy implications. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Themodel
2.1 General framework
The labor market is assumed to be oligopsonistic to take employer market power
into account. The market is made up of nF firms uniformly distributed around a cir-
cle city. The distance between any two firms is 1nF . To simplify the resolution of the
model, there is no free entry or exit in the market. The cost of entry in the mar-
ket is F, which could be considered as the minimum level of capital required to
produce. Each firm uses only labor as an input in order to produce a good sold at
price p on a competitive market. Each worker produces one unit of output during the
period.
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The labor market is composed of a continuum of workers split into two types: Greens
and Reds. The two worker types differ only in an observable characteristic which is
uncorrelated with their productivity. The Reds represent a proportion γ of the working
population, and both types of workers are identically distributed around the circu-
lar market. The length of the circle city correspond to the number nW of workers
in the city. Consequently, the market is composed of nRW = γnW Red workers and
nGW = (1 − γ )nW Greens. The cost of moving is supposed to be too high to be com-
pensated by higher wages. Workers who are discriminated against cannot then move
closer to unprejudiced firms. This is consistent with low mobility of workers, under-
line by Wasmer (2006), Rupert and Wasmer (2007) and Lemoine and Wasmer (2010),
and the theory of thin labor markets developed and summarized in Manning (2003a).
Moreover, Manning and Petrongolo (2011) show that the utility of being offered a
job sharply decays with distance to the job in the UK. This confirms previous find-
ings of Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) for Europe. There are two types of employers:
the first has discriminatory tastes and the second is indifferent over the observable
characteristic distinguishing workers. A proportion η of employers, noted npF = ηnF ,
are taste-based prejudiced against the minority workers. Let d be the monetary term
denoting the manager’s psychic cost of hiring a Red worker. In this model, the labor
market is assumed to be covered. However, if commutation costs or discrimination
are too high, unemployment becomes a possible state. Appendix 2 deals with this
issue.
2.2 Labor supply
In order to work, Reds and Greens have to go to a firm i. All travel occurs along
the circle and a worker who covers a distance xi to work in the firm i spends txi,
where t is the commutating cost (see Fig. 1). The introduction of distance to job
is equivalent to introducing heterogeneity in worker preferences. This is a physi-
cal distance but it can also be interpreted as a non-wage job characteristic offered
by the firms (type of contract, full or part-time, etc.), firm characteristics them-
selves (size, environmental, or social policies, etc.), or informational frictions. This
implies that different jobs are not perfect substitutes for each other. Consequently,
labor supply does not react to small movements in wages: the wage elasticity of
labor supply is small. This heterogeneity leads to market power in the firms’ favor,
which latter can set wages and enjoy an oligopsony position in the labor mar-
ket. This is consistent with Manning and Petrongolo (2011), who show that a large
number of local labor markets compose British labor market because of a rela-
tively high cost of distance. Brueckner et al. (2002) point out the importance of
urban location in the presence of monopsony and how wages are affected by this
market power.
Fig. 1 Dispersion of firms
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Let whi denote the wage offered by firm i to workers in group h. A worker will
accept a job offer only if her net wage is higher than the reservation wage. To
keep the framework simple without loss of generality, the reservation wage is nor-
malized to zero. The worker’s net wage is the wage offered by the firm minus
the commuting cost. As a worker of group h working at xi pays a commuting
cost txi, her net wage is whi − txi. In other words, she or he is willing to work
for firm i if the transportation costs are lower than the offered wage. However,
firm i is not alone on the market and workers compare the net wages offered by
every firm and will work for firm i only if the net wage there is the highest. For-






When we have |whi − whi+1| ≤ tnF for each i and t sufficiently small, i.e., a moder-
ate discrimination to obtain wage dispersion, workers located between i and i + 1 have
no incentive to work for any firm other than i or i + 1. The case of a small transporta-
tion cost is studied in Appendix 3. They decide according to the net wage offered by
each firm. Both types of workers are uniformly distributed around the circle, so that
decision-making is identical whatever group the worker belongs to. This means that they
compare the wage set by firm i minus the transport cost to work at i to that offered
by firm i + 1 minus the commuting cost of working at i + 1. With the previous nota-





t. The worker of
type h located at x˜ = 12t
(
t
nF + whi − whi+1
)
is indifferent between working for firms i
and i + 1. All workers located below her will work for firm i as their transport costs are
lower; the others will work for firm i + 1. Since there is a similar set of workers on the











+ wjRi − w¯Ri
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nF
+ wjGi − w¯Gi
)
(1)
where w¯hi = 12 (whi−1 + whi+1) is the average of the wages offered by the direct
neighbors of firm i. As firms face both types of workers, the labor supply is com-
posed of both Greens and Reds (the right and left hand sides, respectively). In
accordance with Robinson (1934), if labor supply elasticities vary across groups,
the firm can set wages separately for each groups even if workers are equally
productive.
2.3 Labor demand
The employer’s utility function contains both profits and a parameter reflecting the
disutility associated with the employment of Red workers. This means that only
Red workers face discrimination, due to the observable characteristics that, with-
out affecting their productivity, differentiate them from other workers. The owner
of a representative discriminatory firm i is assumed to maximize utility over the
objectives of profit, the employment of Green workers, and the employment of Red










where ji is the firm i’s profit. Employers will
hire workers as long as the marginal utility of doing so is positive. To attract more
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workers, firms have to offer higher wages to compensate for greater commuting




















LjRi − F (2)
where di = d if firm i is prejudiced and 0 otherwise. Ljhi is the number of employ-











= ji − diLjRi. Without taste-based discrimination, utility and profit are
equal. The prejudiced firms have a lower utility because of the taste for discrimination
against Reds.
In this model, firms compete via wages to attract workers. They thus take into account
the behavior of their neighbors and introduce the wage offered by neighboring firms
in their optimization program to determine their own wage. The maximization of
utility produces their reaction function(s). Substituting the labor supply Eq. (1) into









p − tnF + w¯Ri − di
)
(4)
As every firm takes its neighbors’ decisions into account, firm i is affected by
the decisions of all other firms. Moreover, it is worth noting that the discrimina-
tion term does not appear directly in the reaction function of unprejudiced firms:
their reaction function is the same for Greens and Reds, and the wage gap comes
from the term reflecting neighboring wages. As established by Robinson (1934), non-
discriminatory firms then take advantage of the reduced demand for Red workers to
offer them lower wages. The presence of one prejudiced firm in the market affects
the wages of all Reds, even if their employer is not prejudiced. Consequently, a wage
gap between Reds and Greens pertains in every firm in the market. It is important
to note that higher competition induces lower commutation cost and higher wages.
However, discrimination vanishes only if workers can freely choose their employer’s
location, i.e., when the number of firms tends to infinity. More details are given in
Subsection 2.5.
2.4 Equilibrium
Following Bhaskar and To (2003), a unique Nash equilibrium solves this game in
wages even in the presence of discrimination. The proof is described in Appendix
1. The wages of Greens are not affected by the taste for discrimination. They
are identical for all firms, as the reaction functions are the same across firms,
with wGi = p − tnF . This wage does not equal worker productivity due to
the commuting costs. Wage dispersion will result when firm productivity is het-
erogeneous. However, I here retain a simple framework in order to bring out
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the results better. I thus assume uniform productivity without loss of general-
ity. The wages of Reds depend on the proportion of prejudiced firms on the
market and their dispersion on the circle. If η = 1/2 and prejudiced firms
are uniformly distributed, i.e., the different firm types alternate, the wages of
Reds are








If η = 1/3 and prejudiced firms are uniformly distributed, i.e., a prejudiced
firm is circled on two sides by unprejudiced firms but an unprejudiced firm
is surrounded by a prejudiced and an unprejudiced firms, the wages of Reds
are








The mean wage gap with one half of prejudiced firm on the market is 13d, declin-
ing to 25d with one third of discriminatory firms. The proportion of prejudiced
firms on the market positively affects the mean wage gap between Reds and Greens.
Indeed, the less prejudiced firms there are, the lower is their influence on other
wages.
To explore the impact of firm dispersion on the circle, suppose that η = 1/2
and nF = 4 and compare when the different firm types alternate and when
two similar firms are adjacent (two u type firms are followed with two p type
firms, followed by two u firms and so on) (Table 1). The equilibrium wage of
Greens is not sensitive to firm dispersion, but the wage of Reds is. When prej-
udiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (case A), equilibrium wages for Reds
are








and when two identical firms are adjacent (case B), equilibrium wages are








The wage gap between Reds and Greens is less than d in prejudiced firms due to
competition with unprejudiced firms. It is worth noting that the Red wage offered
by non-discriminatory firms is lower than that of Greens. This explains why unprej-
udiced firms are less tempted to expel prejudiced firms as the latter are the source
of their profit. In both cases, the mean wage of Reds is p − tnF − 12d. Conse-
quently, the mean wage gap is not affected by firm dispersion. However, the wage
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differential between the Reds employed by prejudiced and unprejudiced firms is
larger when identical firms are side by side than when they alternate. In case A, a
Red worker employed by an unprejudiced firm earns 13d more than one employed
by a prejudiced firm, as against only 14d in B. The dispersion of firms (Fig. 1)
around the circle affects the standard deviation of the wages of workers who are
discriminated against but does not affect the mean wage of Red workers. Impacts
of discrimination could be reduced by two ways: government can reduce inequal-
ities and decrease standard deviation of the wage gap or decreasing the mean
wage gap.
The payroll depends on the intensity of discriminatory taste, firm dispersion, and
the number of firms on the market–see Appendix 4 for calculations. As shown
in Manning (2010) and in accordance with data, wages and firm size are posi-
tively correlated. The wage bill of Greens is identical whatever the firm and equals
(1 − γ ) 1nF . All of the variation in the payroll comes from the Reds. The wage
bill is lower in prejudiced firms. But it increases with the closeness of other prej-
udiced firms. When two prejudiced firms are side-by-side, their power over the
Reds located between them is greater and they can offer a lower wage and attract
more Reds than when their neighbor is an unprejudiced firm, which offers a higher
wage.
Moreover, the wage bill affects profits: as productivity is constant, firms’ profits
will rise with employment as long as the wage set is less than marginal productiv-
ity. In order to attract an additional worker, the employer has to increase slightly
the wage to compensate for commuting costs of more distant individuals. The higher
is the wage bill, the higher are wages, as the labor supply curve is not perfectly
elastic. Profits are sensitive to discrimination and firm dispersion. In both cases,
discrimination increases the profits of all firms, but more so in unprejudiced than
in prejudiced firms. Moreover, profits are higher for unprejudiced firms and when
these alternate with prejudiced firms. They increase with the taste for discrimina-
tion. Prejudiced firms make less profit but these increase with the proximity of similar
firms.
To summarize the results here, the presence of one prejudiced firm on the mar-
ket induces a lower wage for all of the workers who are discriminated against,
as in the model of Black (1995). In addition, unprejudiced firms also make addi-
tional profit and have little incentive to compete against each other to drive
out prejudiced firms. If they did, prejudiced firms would be replaced by non-
discriminatory firms, reducing the profits of established firms. Last but not least,
firms make more profit when they are located in an area close to similar
firms.
2.5 The impact of competition
Becker assumes that competition affects the extent of discrimination on the labor mar-
ket. The more competition there is, the less the taste for discrimination can be satisfied.
We here analyze how a new firm on the market impacts discrimination and show
that the presence of imperfection on the labor market reduces the impact of com-
petition in the product market on discrimination. Two different types of entry are
modelized.
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An increase in the number of firms n, due to lower entry costs F or better technology,
has a positive effect on labor market competition. The more firms there are on the mar-
ket, the closer we are to perfect competition. If we consider this change at the beginning
of the game, this model is static and firms are uniformly distributed around the circle. As
the number of firms increases, and if they remain uniformly distributed, then the distance
between firms is reduced and the impact of transportation costs on wages is lower. Wages
thus rise with the number of firms and become closer to worker productivity as commut-
ing costs become smaller. Even so, the impact of discrimination remains the same as that
described above. The presence of some commuting costs prevents the total disappearance
of discrimination.
Nevertheless, the effect is different if the dispersion of existing firms is invari-
ant. If existing firms are already located on the circle, and the new one is inserted
between two old firms, then firms are no longer uniformly distributed around
the circle and the distribution of market power changes. The market power of
firms in the neighborhood of the new entrant falls, whereas that of firms fur-
ther away rises. The former consequently fix a lower wage than do the others.
Indeed, firms do not differentiate workers located on the right side from workers of
the other side. As the market is asymmetrical, firms further away could take over
workers of their neighbors, which set a lower wage to compete against the new
firm.
In both cases: a new unprejudiced firm reduces the impact of discriminatory tastes
whereas a new prejudiced firm increases it.
In this paragraph, I consider the case where n = 4 to explore more easily
the properties of the model. Assume that a fifth firm wants to enter the mar-
ket. It locates itself between two existing firms (see Fig. 2). Depending on the dis-
persion of the other firms, it can be located between two identical firms or two
different firms. In both cases, the distance between the new firm and its neigh-
bors is 1/8 instead of 1/4 in the rest of the circle. Consequently, the sharing of
market power changes: the market power of the existing firms F1 and F2, near
the new entrant, falls because of the closeness of this new firm. On the contrary,
both firms F3 and F4, which are not neighbors to the new firm, have greater mar-
ket power and can set lower wages for their workers and attract more workers.
Indeed, there is less competition on this side of the circle. Consequently, their pay-
roll increases because F1 and F2 set a lower wage than before to compete against the
new firm.
Fig. 2 A fifth firm enters the market
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Moreover the new firm, whether prejudiced or not, will choose to set up in the
neighborhood of prejudiced firms in order to pay Red workers less. The introduc-
tion of a prejudiced new firm will also lower the wages of Reds in other firms. An
unprejudiced firm with prejudiced neighbors employs more Red workers than its neigh-
bors; it also earns more profits than its neighbors (as it hires more Red workers) and
earns more profits than if it had located in an area with non-prejudiced neighbors.
The new firm thus benefits from the presence of prejudiced firms in its immediate
neighborhood.
New firm entry therefore affects the sharing of market power. Strategically, the new
entrant will locate where the greatest number of prejudiced firms are found but does not
systematically decrease discrimination.
3 Policy implications
The analysis above has shown that greater competition reduces the wage gap but
does not eliminate it. Since imperfect competition is clearly the reality (Manning
(2003b)), governments have to implement suitable policies in order to decrease
the wage gap due to discrimination. This section describes a number of pos-
sible policies, direct or indirect, aiming to fight discrimination. The govern-
ment here wants to reduce the wage differential between Green and Red work-
ers and maximize the welfare. It finances these policies by public loan or a
flat rate tax noted β . Without any government intervention, the global welfare
is





This welfare increases when competition on the labor market is higher (t lower
or nF higher). The impact of discrimination is more ambiguous: when d is
higher, the surplus of firms increases but the welfare of workers decreases,
depending on the number of Reds. Derivatives are in Appendix 5. In order
to better examine the impact of policies, nF = 4 with half of the firms,
which are prejudiced. Prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate on the circle
city.
3.1 Employment subsidies
The government can decide to subsidize the wages of Reds in order to compensate
for discrimination. This policy is not currently used in order to decrease gender gap.
However, it exists concerning young people and low-skilled workers in France for
instance, the most remote from employment in Canada or disabled in several coun-
tries.
The subsidy is allocated to every firm based on the stock of Red workers on its books
to pull up the wage rates of all discriminated workers. As the government does not
know the type of firms, it subsidizes the wages of all Reds and not only those hired by
prejudiced firms. The utility function of firms becomes Uji = pLji − βLji − wjGiLjGi −
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(
wjRi + di − s
)












p − β − t4 + w¯Ri − di + s
)
The global welfare is W = p − β − 18 t + γ s − γ 53 d
2
t . If the government is
budget constrained, receipts and expenses are set equal to each other and β =
s LRL = γ s. If the government finances by borrowing, it does not need taxes and
β = 0. In both cases, the subsidy on the wages of Red workers raises the wages
of Reds by the amount of the subsidy whatever the firm. The method of sub-
sidy funding only changes the impact of the policy on the global welfare and the
wages of Greens. In the case of borrowing and as our workers are not forward
looking, the wages of Greens are unchanged and welfare increases. If the govern-
ment has to balance receipts and expenses, subsidies are borne by all workers, so
this is equivalent to a tax on the hiring of Green workers and the total welfare
remains constant. In the case of a flat rate tax on employment, the total welfare
does not change and the surplus of workers is equivalent to the loss of firms’ wel-
fare. Within workers, Greens lose a part of their surplus whereas Reds increase
their welfare.
3.2 Wage equalization
With a policy of wage equalization, firms have to offer the same wage to all equally pro-
ductive workers. This policy exists in most of countries. Wage equality between men
and women doing equal work has been introduced in 1963 in the USA law and in the
1957 Treaty in order to fight gender discrimination among others. In spite of the intro-
duction of legal principles, the difference between wages of women and men remains
large—16.4 % in the EU on average for instance.
In our model, both groups of workers are equally productive. Firms then have to









LjRi = pLji − wjiLji − diLjRi. Utility maximization leads





p − t4 + w¯i − γdi
)
Firms set a single wage, and the wage gap totally vanishes within each firm. The wage
now depends on the proportion of Reds in the working population. The more there are,
the lower is the firm’s wage. The wage differential between unprejudiced and prejudiced
firms is 13γd. Consequently, Reds earn higher wages than they would have without wage
equalization as γ < 1, but the wages of Greens are lower. Moreover, unprejudiced firms
employ a greater number of both Red and Green workers than do prejudiced firms due to
the higher wage. Nevertheless, the wages of Greens are lower than they would have been
without the policy.
The global welfare slightly decreases due to this policy. The disappearance of the direct
impact of discrimination on wages within firms negatively affects the well-being of the









Table 1 Impact of reforms in the case of a four-firm market–firms alternate




wkRi = p + s − β − t4 − 13d
wuRi = p − t4 − 13γ d wkRi = wPrejudiced wpRi = p − t4 − 23γ d
Greens
Unprejudiced
wkRi = p + s − β − t4 − 23d
wuGi = p − t4 − 13γ d wkGi = p − t4Prejudiced wpGi = p − t4 − 23γ d
Global welfare p − t16 − γ d + γ 59 d
2
t + sγ − β p − t16 − γ d + γ 59 d
2
t p − t16 − 12γ d




wuRi = p − t4
(





wkRi = p + s − β − t4 − 23d wkRi = p + s − β − t4 − 23d
Prejudiced
wpRi = p − t4
(







wuGi = p − t4
(
1 + τ τ(1−γ )−γ (1−τ)k
)
− 13 τ γ (1−τ)k d
wkGi = p + s − β − t4 − 13d wkGi = p + s − β − t4 − 13d
Prejudiced
wpGi = p − t4
(
1 + 2τ τ(1−γ )−γ (1−τ)k
)
− 23 τ γ (1−τ)k d
Global welfare p − t′16 − γ d + γ 59 d
2
t′ p − t16 − γ d + γ 59 d
2
t − T p − t16 − γ d + γ 59 d
2








−4dγ (1 − τ))]
with k = τ 2(1 − γ ) + γ (1 − τ)2 and λ = 3[(τ (1−γ )−γ (1−τ))t/n+γ (1−τ)d/3]
τ 2(1−γ )+γ (1−τ))
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where economic agents maximize their revenues, the government will have no political
incentive to reduce discrimination for fear of not being re-elected.
3.3 Minimumwage
Introduction of a minimum wage is a frequent policy to alleviate the poverty of work-
ing poor. Blumkin and Danziger (2014) show that this policy can be socially beneficial to
supplement an optimal tax-and-transfer system. However, depending on the level of min-
imum wage, wage distribution is truncated for low productivity workers. In this case, it
could have a negative impact on employment (Addison et al. (2015) for a recent study).
Only few developed countries did not adopt the minimum wage. Germany introduces it
in 2015, and Italy plans to do it.
In our study, this policy aims at increasing Red wages and consequently reducing wage
gap. Three different cases can arise. The minimum wage is binding for all wages; it is
binding for Red wages only; it is binding for Red wages of prejudiced firms. I study the
last case as the results of the second case are more complicated and the comparison is not
easy. Theoretically, the welfare should be between the benchmark case and the case when
minimum wage is binding for all Red wages.
Green wages are not impacted by minimum wage. Only Red wages are binding by min-
imum wage and wjiR = w. Minimum wage induces a decrease of the wage gap between
Reds and Greens. Red treatment is identical whatever the type of the firm. The wel-
fare increase in 12d − γ 59 d
2
t if γd ≤ 910 t. As shown in the literature,5 the existence of
monopsony power raises the possibility that minimum wage increases employment.
3.4 Affirmative action
Affirmative action policies take different forms, ranging from requirements to give spe-
cial consideration to those from minority groups to setting quotas on employment of
minority workers. Affirmative action policy was introduced in the USA to promote
blacks in education system and labor market. For instance in France, firms have to
hire a quota of disable people or to pay a tax. Concerning women, targets and quotas
for the promotion or recruitment of women in employment are rarer. Recently, some
countries have adopted legislation aimed at a more balanced gender representation in
company boards (Finland, France, Germany, Italy, etc.). In some countries like Germany,
public institutions are under an obligation to adopt equality plans to increase women’s
representation.
In our model, affirmative action consists in imposing a quota of minority workers on
firms. This secures a minimum level of employment for workers who are discriminated
against in each firm. Suppose that the aim is to employ a minimal proportion of τ Red
workers in each firm. Assume that τ ≤ γ in order to obtain a solution and that τ is greater
than the proportion of Red workers in the prejudiced firm setting the lowest wage. Firms
maximize their utility as in Section 2 under the constraint that LjRi ≥ τLjGi.
The presence of the quota of Red workers affects all wages in all firms. The intro-
duction of affirmative action increases the demand for the labor of Red workers in
prejudiced firms and relatively reduces the demand for Green workers. This impact
depends on the quota and the proportion of Red workers on the circle: the closer these
two percentage terms are, the tighter is the market for Red workers and the higher is
the wage of Reds. The general impact of the affirmative action policy is also positive
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for the wages of workers who are discriminated against and negative for the wages
of workers belonging to the majority. The effect on the wages of workers in preju-
diced firms is twice as high as that in unprejudiced firms. As discriminatory firms
now employ relatively more Reds (and fewer Greens) than beforehand, Red wages have
to be higher (and Green wages lower) to attract the required number of workers to
the firm.
The total welfare does not change if τ = 3tγ−dnγ3t−dnγ and increases if τ is lower. However,
as the Greens are the majority of the working population, governments which want to be
re-elected will have little incentive to introduce this policy.
3.5 Improving transport
Investments in transportation infrastructure or in improving the city transportation net-
work lead to lower commuting costs for all workers in the city. For instance, the French
government policy of “Grand Paris” aims to reduce the commuting costs of poor workers
located in the Paris suburbs. The project will improve access to the economic centers of
Paris and its suburbs. As women’s elasticity of labor supply is lower than men’s elasticity,
this policy will also reduce wage gap between men and women.
In the model, this policy implies lower t. As t falls and |whi − whi+1| ≤ t4 , the
wage gap is smaller in percentage terms but remains the same in absolute terms as
there is no interaction between the transportation cost and the discriminatory term.
Moreover, the global welfare increases further to the policy if the project is not
funded by taxes. Otherwise, the total welfare only increases if investment return is
positive.
A transport policy thus increases wages and leads to a relative fall in the wage gap
between the majority and the minority. The firms’ market power on workers decreases
due to fall of transportation costs but the wage of workers increases. In the par-
ticular case of sufficiently low commuting costs, the effect on discrimination is not
straightforward.
3.6 Transport subsidies
A second indirect policy consists in subsidizing commuting costs. This is used to help
particular populations (e.g., young people, unemployed, older people) but rarely women.
For instance in France, employment agencies reimburse to unemployed commuting costs
to a firm. Transport companies—SNCF, RATP, etc.—offer young and old people special
prices but also people benefiting from minimum livelihoods.
In order to reduce the wage gap and favor the minority, the government supports finan-
cially a part of Reds’ transportation costs. In the model, it is equivalent to have two
different commuting costs, depending on the worker’s group. Maximizing the welfare












p − β − t − s4 + w¯Ri − di
)
The wage gap decreases by s4 due to subsidies. However, payroll is not impacted by this
policy and prejudiced firms hire less Reds than Greens. Firms lose a part of their market
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γ s with the subvention.
To conclude this section, indirect policy aiming at increasing labor market competi-
tion via better transport increases wages, but the wage gap remains the same in value.
On the contrary, a transport subsidy for workers discriminated against leads to an
increase of global welfare and a decrease of the wage gap. An employment subsidy for
Red workers’ employment does not lead to a first-best solution and has no impact on
the wages of Greens when funded by borrowing. Wage equalization and affirmative
action are more efficient policies: however, governments of economic agents maxi-
mizing their revenues have little incentive to introduce them as they reduce majority
well-being.
4 Conclusions
This paper has shown that a taste-based model of discrimination can match the styl-
ized facts of the persistence of discrimination. The model is based on the heterogeneity
of worker preferences, which yields non-negligible employer market power over their
workers. This assumption induces a wage gap, which will not disappear in equilibrium,
reinforcing findings of previous models. Unprejudiced firms make non-zero profits due
to the existence of discriminatory firms in the market and are thus not prompted to drive
out prejudiced firms as they represent a source of profit. Contrary to most models in
the literature, including Black (1995), there is no segregation between groups, and both
types of workers are hired by all firms. Last but not the least, the existence of only one
prejudiced firm in the market leads to a wage gap between Reds and Greens without
there being any differences in observable productive abilities. The wage of Reds is not
unique in the labor market, and the dispersion depends on the concentration of unprej-
udiced firms. Moreover, firms’ location matters as a firm close to similar firms makes
more profits.
Greater competition on the market reduces the wage gap but does not suffice to make
it disappear, except if commuting costs totally vanish. Complementary policy initiatives
are required for this, but if economic agents maximize their revenues, governments have
no incentive to introduce them for re-election reasons. Improving transport or subsi-
dizing commuting costs are most efficient and increase wages whatever the workers’
color.
Firms are assumed to be homogeneous in this model. A model with heterogeneous
firms and productivity levels could also be analyzed. It is also natural to expect more
productive firms to have higher sales, which require a larger labor force. Being more
productive, these firms can afford to pay higher wages to attract the additional work-
ers they need. The wages of Greens will then follow some kind of distribution and
will not be identical whatever the firm. However, the main results would remain
unchanged.
Endnotes
1For the USA, see Black and Strahan (2001), Hellerstein et al. (1999), and Ashenfelter
and Hannan (1986); Heywood and Peoples (1994) examine the banking industry and
Peoples and Saunders (1993) the trucking industry.
2See Hellerstein et al. (2002) concerning women and Peoples and Talley (2001) and
Comanor (1973) concerning Blacks, for American results.
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3Black and Brainerd (2004) study the USA case and Berik et al. (2004) Taiwan and
Korea. Liberalization reduces the wage gap, except in Taiwan, where the wage gap effect
is positive in concentrated industries.
4For a literature review of theoretical models dealing with racial discrimination and
their limits, see Lang and Lehmann (2012). Models of Black (1995), Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002), Rosén (2003), and Lang et al. (2005) are particularly significant in this literature.
5See Ashenfelter et al. (2010) for instance.
Appendices
Appendix 1: the unique Nash equilibrium
The optimal wage setting rule for all firms can be rewritten as a function of matrices:
wj = Aj + Bwj (6)
where j is the type of workers, the matrix Aj is a diagonal matrix composed of elements
ai = 12
(
p − tn − di
)
where di = 0 in wG or if the firm is unprejudiced and di = d in wR if
the firm is prejudiced. When η = 1/2 and prejudiced firms are uniformly distributed on










4 . . . 0 0
0 14 0
. . . ...
... . . . . . . 14 0










If the matrix S = (I − B)−1 exists, then w∗ = SA. The existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium is based on two conditions:
1. Equation (6) is a contraction mapping. In this case, the function converges on its fix
point whatever the wage initial vector. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium exists
and is unique in each case.
2. S exists. This condition is the mathematical condition to the existence for a
solution.
Condition 1
Proof. Given x, x′ ∈ R, let d(x, x′) = maxi
∣∣xi − x′i∣∣. Let w, w′ be two wage vectors, and
let f, f ′ be the associated optimal wages given by (6). For any i, we have
∣∣fi − f ′i ∣∣ = 14
∣∣(wi−1 − w′i−1) + (wi+1 − w′i+1)∣∣ (8)
≤ 14 [ 2 d(w,w′)] (9)
Since d(f , f ′) ≤ 12d(w,w′), (6) is a contracting mapping. It is straightforward that f is
increasing, i.e., if x ≥ x′, then f (x) ≥ f (x′).
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Condition 2
Proof. Since I − B is a circulant matrix, S is also a circulant matrix. Circulant matrices
can be defined by their first row. Let s = (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1). Note that S(I − B) = I. So s
must solve:
s0 − 14 s1 −
1
4 sn−1 = 1 (10)
−14 sk + sk −
1
4 sk+1 = 0 for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 3 (11)
−14 s0 −
1
4 sn−2 + sn−1 = 0 (12)
Notice that the second equation is a second-order linear difference equation. Then, its
characteristic roots are
λ1 = 12 −
√
3 (13)
λ2 = 12 +
√
3 (14)
Since 0 < λ1 < 1 < λ2, the general solution to the second equation is
sk = Cλk1 + Dλk2 (15)
for arbitrary constants C and D. Substituting in the two other equations leads to a system







which are both positive. Therefore, st > 0∀k = 0, . . . , n − 1.
Since S is circulant and symmetric, we could observe sk = sn−k for k = 1, . . . , n2 . Since
λ1 < 1 and λ2 > 1 and sk is non-monotonic in k, it must first be declining and then be
rising. However, since S is symmetric, it must be the case that s0 > s1 > . . . > s n2 .
Two more conditions are necessary to have a well-behaved equilibrium in order to
bound ai given parameters n, d, and t. First, the market have to be covered. Second, the
wage setting rule, which satisfies the first-order condition for profit maximization, has to
be globally optimal. Concerning wages of Green workers, equilibrium wages are identical
in each firms. Concerning wages of Reds, both conditions have to be verified.
The first condition suggests that, in equilibrium, ∀i, i¯, where i¯ = i+1 or i¯ = i−1, |wji −
wji¯| ≤ tn . It means that all workers work for one of the nearest firms. The maximum value
taken by this difference is when all prejudiced firms are side by side and unprejudiced








p − tn − d
)
≤ 1s0 − s n2
t
n (18)
⇔ d ≤ 1s0 − s n2
t
n (19)
The second condition is that the market has to be covered. A firm does not want to
choose a wage so high as to capture its neighbors’ markets if the net revenue product
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should be no greater than the wage which would be sufficient to capture the neighboring











To summarize, the first condition allows to cover the market and have an equilibrium.
The second condition gives a bound which is greater than ai when i is prejudiced provided
that t is sufficiently large.
Appendix 2: a particular case: the uncoveredmarket
Individuals only work if their net wage is positive. In the main part, the assumption of
a zero reservation wage and a reasonable level of discrimination allow the market to be
covered. However, if wage does not compensate commutation costs, which means d <
2t
nF , worker is unemployed. Consequently, circle labor market is no more covered and an
unemployment pool separates each firm. Firms are also monopsonists and wages set up







2 (p − di)
where di = d if j = u and zero otherwise. If the labor market of Greens is covered,
findings concerning Greens in the previous part are still valid. In this case, Reds are only
discriminated against by prejudiced firms and the wage gap is d/2 in prejudiced firm and
inexistent in unprejudiced firms.
Then, the wage bill is
LjGi =
1
2t (1 − γ )p
LjRi =
1
2t γ (p − di)






2 − 14t γd
2
i
An uncovered market means that distance between two firms is slightly higher than
half the sum of wage bill of each nearby firms. Consequently, nF = tnwpnw+t firms enter the
market if both markets are uncovered. Moreover, between both types firms, γd
2
2t + 1nw
Reds are unemployed whereas only 1nw Greens are unemployed between two firms.
Appendix 3: a particular case: a small commuting cost
If the transportation cost is sufficiently small that the wage differential between preju-
diced and unprejudiced firms is greater than tnF , some workers will have an incentive
to work for firms other than the two nearest. As such, other firms on the circle offer a
net wage which is higher than that offered by the two nearest firms. Labor supply now
depends on the type of firm that the worker can reach. If different types of firms alter-
nate, no Red workers will choose to work for a prejudiced firm, as the wage proposed
by unprejudiced firms is sufficiently high to compensate for the additional transporta-
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tion costs required to reach them. The labor supply of Reds is thus only shared between
unprejudiced firms. Then, the labor supply of firm i is
Lui =
1
t (1 − γ )
[ t
nF









t (1 − γ )
[ t
nF
+ wGi − w¯Gi
]
where wRi′ is the Red wage offered by the other unprejudiced firms.
Employers maximize their utility taking into account the labor supply and wages of
their neighbors. Substituting labor supplies into utilities and then solving the first-order
condition yields the following reaction function:
wGi = 12
(






p − 2tnF + w¯Ri′
)
Then equilibrium wages are
wGi = p − tnF
wuRi = p −
2t
nF
The impact of the discrimination term (d) is not directly observable because only
unprejudiced firms are interested in hiring Red workers. This term intervenes only in
the decision process of workers and no longer in the maximization process of firms. The
labor demand for Red workers is also lower than that of Green workers. Due to this lower
demand, the wage of Reds offered by unprejudiced firms is lower than that of Greens.
The sub-market of Red workers contains only the unprejudiced firms. The market power
of unprejudiced firms is thus greater than before and they set lower wages to maximize
profits. Both unprejudiced firms are in competition a la Cournot. As in matching mod-
els, segregation can result because prejudiced firms do not hire Red workers and the
wage differential comes essentially from the difference in labor demand between Reds and
Greens. For the special case when t = 0, workers can choose any firm without additional
costs. Red workers choose one of the non-discriminatory firms and their wage stays lower
because the demand for Reds’ labor is lower than that for Greens and the labor market is
segregated between unprejudiced and prejudiced firms. The wage gap is only based on the
difference in the number of unprejudiced and prejudiced firms. The more unprejudiced
firms there are on the market, the greater is the wage gap between both types of workers.
The situation is more complex as the firms are not symmetrically distributed on the
market. The wage differential can then be sufficiently high between some firms that Red
workers work for unprejudiced firms (but not between others). Consequently, some Red
individuals will work for prejudiced firms because it is too expensive to reach the nearest
unprejudiced firm. The market then becomes very heterogeneous and many situations
can be conceived. The effect on the wage gap is ambiguous: the demand for Red labor
is lower, and so is their wage. However, market power is no longer symmetrically shared
and the fact that some firms have more market power reduces wages in some parts of the
market and increases them in others.
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Appendix 4: wage bills and profits
Appendix 4.1: wage bills































When prejudiced and unprejudiced firms alternate (A), the profits of firms are
ui =




















When identical firms are side by side(B), the profits of the firms are
ui =



























16 − γ 518 dt
2
∂W







= d( 59 dt − 1)
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Economics is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The author declares
that she has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Yves Zenou, Pierre Cahuc and seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics, the AFSE
Conference, and the Mainz Workshop in Labor Economics for their useful remarks. I thank the editor and reviewers for
their comments and suggestions, which significantly contributed to improve the quality of the paper. This paper reflects
the opinions of the author and does not necessarily express the views of the Banque de France.
Responsible editor: Joni Hersch
Received: 20 October 2015 Accepted: 8 April 2016
References
Addison J, Blackburn M, Cotti C (2015) On the robustness of minimum wage effects: geographically-disparate trends and
job growth equations. IZA J Labor Econ 4(1):1–16
Berson IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:5 Page 21 of 21
Altonji JG, Pierret CR (2001) Employer learning and statistical discrimination. Q J Econ 116(1):313–350. NBER Working
Papers 6279
Arrow KJ (1971) The theory of discrimination. Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section
403
Ashenfelter O, Hannan T (1986) Sex discrimination and product market competition: the case of the banking industry.
Q J Econ 101(1):149–73
Ashenfelter O, Farber H, Ransom M (2010) Labor market monopsony. J Labor Econ 28(2):203–210
Barth C, Dale-Olsen H (2009) Monopsonistic discrimination, worker turnover and the gender wage gap. Labour Econ
16(5):589–597
Becker G (1971) The economics of discrimination. University of Chicago Press
Berik G, van der Meulen Rodgers Y, Zveglich JJ (2004) International trade and gender wage discrimination: evidence from
east asia. Rev Dev Econ 8(2):237–254
Bhaskar V, To T (2003) Oligopsony and the distribution of wages. Eur Econ Rev 47(2):371–399
Bhaskar V, Manning A, To T (2002) Oligopsony and monopsonistic competition in labor markets. J Econ Perspect
16(2):155–174
Black DA (1995) Discrimination in an equilibrium search model. J Labor Econ 13(2):309–33
Black S, Brainerd E (2004) Importing equality? The impact of globalization on gender discrimination. Ind Labor Relat Rev
57(4):540–559
Black S, Strahan P (2001) The division of spoils: rent-sharing and discrimination in a regulated industry. Am Econ Rev
91(4):814–831
Blumkin T, Danziger L (2014) Deserving poor and the desirability of a minimum wage, IZA Discussion Paper No. 8418.
https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8418.html
Boal W, Ransom M (1997) Monopsony in the labor market. J Econ Lit 35(1):86–112
Bonhomme S, Jolivet G (2009) The pervasive absence of compensating differentials. J Appl Economet 24:763–795
Booth AL, Katic P (2011) Estimating the wage elasticity of labour supply to a firm: what evidence is there for monopsony?
Econ Record 87(278):359–369
Bowlus A, Eckstein Z (2002) Discrimination and skill differences in an equilibrium search model. Int Econ Rev
43(4):1309–1345
Brueckner JK, Thisse JF, Zenou Y (2002) Local labor markets, job matching, and urban location. Int Econ Rev 43(1):151–171
Comanor W (1973) Racial discrimination in american industry. Economica 40(160):363–378
Falch T (2011) Teacher mobility responses to wage changes: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment. Am Econ Rev
101(3):460–65
Hamilton J, Thisse JF, Zenou Y (2000) Wage competition with heterogeneous workers and firms. J Labor Econ
18(3):453–472
Hellerstein J, Neumark D, Troske K (1999) Wages, productivity, and worker characteristics: evidence from plant-level
production functions and wage equations. J Labor Econ 17(3):409–446
Hellerstein J, Neumark D, Troske K (2002) Market forces and sex discrimination. J Hum Resour 37:353–380
Heywood J, Peoples J (1994) Deregulation and the prevalence of black truck drivers. J Law Econ 37(1):133–155
Hotelling H (1929) Stability in competition. Econ J 39(153):41–57
Lang K, Lehmann JYK (2012) Racial discrimination in the labor market: theory and empirics. J Econ Lit 50(4):959–1006
Lang K, Manove M, Dickens W (2005) Racial discrimination in labor markets with posted wage offers. Am Econ Rev
95(4):1327–1340
Lemoine M, Wasmer E (2010) Collection: Les Rapports du Conseil d’analyse économique. Editor: La Documentation
française
Manning A (2003a) Monopsony in motion: imperfect competition in labour markets. Princeton University Press
Manning A (2003b) The real thin theory: monopsony in modern labour markets. Labour Econ 10:105–131
Manning A (2010) The plant size-place effect: agglomeration and monopsony in labour markets. J Econ Geography
10(5):717–744
Manning A (2011) Imperfect competition in the labor market, vol 4B. David Card and Orley Ashenfelter, chap 11
Manning A, Petrongolo B (2011) How local are labor markets? Evidence from a spatial job search model. https://ideas.
repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/8686.html
Peoples JJ, Saunders L (1993) Trucking deregulation and the black/white wage gap. Ind Labor Relat Rev 47:23–35
Peoples JJ, Talley W (2001) Black-white earnings differentials: privatization versus deregulation. Am Econ Rev
91(2):164–168
Phelps E (1972) The statistical theory of racism and sexism. Am Econ Rev 62(4):639–651
Ransom M, Oaxaca R (2010) New market power models and sex differences in pay. J Labor Econ 28(2):267–289
Ransom MR, Sims DP (2010) Estimating the firm’s labor supply curve in a “new monopsony” framework: school teachers
in Missouri. J Labor Econ 28(2):331–355
Robinson J (1934) The economics of imperfect competition. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 97(4):671–674
Rosén A (2003) Search, bargaining and employer discrimination. J Labor Econ 21:807–829
Rupert P, Wasmer E (2007) Housing and the labor market: time to move and aggregate unemployment. J Monetary Econ
59(1):24–36
Salop SC (1979) Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell J Econ 10(1):141–156
Staiger D, Spetz J, Phibbs C (2010) Is there monopsony in the labor market? Evidence from a natural experiment. J Labor
Econ 28(2):211–236
Thisse JF, Zenou Y (1995) Appariement et concurrence spatiale sur le marché du travail. Revue Economique 46(3):615–625
Wasmer E (2006) Interpreting Europe-US labor market differences: the specificity of human capital investments. Am Econ
Rev 93(3):811–831
Wauthy X, Zenou Y (1999) Le rôle de l’hétérogénéité des agents sur le marché du travail en concurrence imparfaite.
Revue Economique 50(5):965–984
